and political repression has not abated significantly. Opponents of the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier are denied the right to organize, union activity and political expression are closely monitored; prison, torture, and exile are used to suppress dissent (Organization of American States [OAS], 1983; Amnesty, 1983) .
Thus many who have left Haiti in the last quarter century-or in the last five years-well may be "economic migrants," as the State Department has consistently claimed. Yet others, whose flight was motivated by personal fear, clearly meet the present American, and long-standing international, definitions of "refugee."
The importance of distinguishing between "economic migrants" and political "refugees" has become clearer since 1980, though such a distinction has in fact been relevant to Haitian migrants since the early 1970s. In 1980, growing resistance to Indochinese refugee flow, concerns about illegal Mexican migration, and the boat lift of some 125,000 Cubans from Mariel harbor demonstrated that not every alien would be welcomed.
Yet in that year, Congress enacted a new refugee law that, for the first time, unequivocally guaranteed asylum to any migrant from any country arriving in United States and able to demonstrate a personal, "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."
The present asylum rights of Haitians are more generous than they have ever been in the past. Yet Haitians have in fact been claiming asylm or its equivalent in significant numbers since the early 1970s, and have been especially discriminated against.
Long-standing prejudice and restrictionist fears cannot be ignored as contributing factors. Yet it is the contention of this article that the principal reason for the special immigration animus against Haitians, particularly as it has displayed itself in the handling of political asylum claims, has been the close political relationship between the United States and the Duvaliers pere and fils. We argue that shared anticommunist objectives have taken priority over human rights concerns since the late 1950s, and that individual asylum applicants, and the integrity of the asylum determination process, have been the primary victims of (Lundahl, 1979: 623-627; Boswell, 1982: 18) . These flows were temporarily halted in the 1930s due to worldwide economic depression and a massacre of Haitians ordered by the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo.
Another wave of mass emigration from Haiti was initiated in the mid 1950s. Economic stagnation and political turmoil, followed by the consolidation of power by Duvalier, caused thousands of Haitians to flee to the United States, Canada, France, Africa, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin. From the ouster of the former President Paul E.
Magloire in December 1956, to Duvalier's accession to power, six provisional regimes had attempted to gain power in Haiti.
Finally, in July 1957, a military junta headed by General Kebreau took control and set elections for September of that year. Dr.
Duvalier was the favored candidate of the junta and every effort (including disqualifying candidates and strict censoring of the media prior to the election) was made to ensure his victory.
Duvalier assumed power in September 1957 in one of the poorest countries of the world. The country was in dire economic straits despite attempts by both the IMF and United States to stabilize the country through special assistance programs (New York Times, 1957a; 1957b 1958 World Bank, 1981; Lundahl, 1979) . A recent World
Bank survey determined that three out of four Haitians live at or below the absolute poverty level and that per capita income in many rural areas is less than $100 (1981) .
The Haitian poverty, however, results not from demographic pressures, soil erosion, and natural scarcity alone. It also derives from deliberately maintained patterns of economic inequality and abuses of political power (Lundahl, 1979: 623-647; Roberts, 1978; Lichtenberg, 1982) . According to one scholarly study of the Haitian economy:
In spite of the compelling fact that agriculture has always constituted the very backbone of the Haitian economy, the Haitian governments have traditionally done next to nothing to improve the lot of the peasants. The gulf between the peasant and his government is abysmally wide.... Economic development has never been a political goal in Haiti. Instead, a never-ending stream of kleptocracies who could think of little else than filling their pockets have squandered the available funds in their attempts to gain or retain the presidency [Lundahl, 1979: 636; U. S. AID, the collection of revenues and expenditures, and there have been continual reports of government curruption and mismanagement of funds. Thus, a 1979 World Bank report revealed that in 1977 almost 40% of all expenditures and revenues were channeled through special checking accounts held at the National Bank, making it virtually impossible to determine their source or eventual disposition (World Bank, 1981) . In 1978, the Congressional Research Service estimated that 50% of Haiti's income was in unbudgeted accounts that were presumed to end up in private hands (Roberts, 1978) . In its 1979 report on human rights in Haiti, the U. S. State Department concluded: "Corruption is traditional at all levels of society, and significant amounts of domestic revenues usable for development continue to be diverted to personal enrichment (U. S. State Department, 1980: 344) ."
Even the money that Haiti does devote to legitimate government expenditures has little effect on easing economic and social inequalities. The Haitian government devotes less domestic revenue per capita than any other country in the hemisphere to such social necessities as public education, public health, or agricultural extension services (Lundahl, 1979: 641) .
Once in power, Francois Duvalier ruthlessly purged the country of all real and suspected opposition. He systematically reduced the political role of the army, dismissed successive commanders-in-chief and a large number of professional officers of all ranks, and closed the military academy (Heinl and Heinl, 1978 , 1963: 19-25; 1966: 1-5; 1967: 28-33; Heinl, and Heinl, 1978; Rotberg, 1971; Deiderich and Burt, 1969; Manigat, 1964 All other potential opposition was likewise crushed. The National Union of Haitian Workers, which was the largest association of labor unions, was disbanded. The government used coercion to enforce press censorship. The Catholic churh was silenced as a political force through expulsion of its leadership.
The legislative and judicial branches delegated all their effective authority to the president who ruled the country for most of his tenure under a state of emergency. The government deliberately ignored individual freedoms, and hundreds of political prisoners were taken and held at Fort Dimanche, the notorious "death prison." Numerous organizations protested human rights violations there (New York Times, 1958h; 1958g; 1958f; 1958e; 1958d; 1958a; 1959a) (Segal, 1975: 197-204) .
Almost all Haitians who entered the U.S. arrived by air with some type of visa. The majority of those with nonimmigrant visas simply overstayed and remained illegally. Perhaps because these
Haitians were generally well-educated and reasonably well-to-do, the U.S. Immigration Service (INS) took a laissez-faire attitude toward them, did not actively pursue those who remained illegally, and rarely deported them. If Haitians claimed political refugee status, the INS ordinarily placed them under "docket control," in effect failing to enforce orders of deportation while granting work authorization, yet denying all opportunity to obtain "permanent residence" status (Dominguez, 1975: 31 Duvalier's government [Herter, 1958] . (Schmidt, 1971) . After the war, it was exerted through economic and, as time progressed, direct military aid. Economic aid began in 1946, and the U.S.
provided about $120 million in economic assistance between 1946
and 1972 (Weil, 1973: 124, 145-146) . Under the 1951 Military Security Act, the U.S. extended Haiti $4.5 million in military aid from 1950 to 1963, after which the program was discontinued until 1970 (Weil, 1973) . Bilateral military assistance agreements were first entered into in 1955. In return, Haiti supported American positions in the United Nations and the OAS.
With the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba in January 1959, Cuba became the site of the first Marxist-Leninist revolution in the Americas and a source of chronic concern in the U.S. The U.S. was particularly concerned that Cuba, in its general desire to export revolution in the region, might use Haitian exiles to organize and support a movement to overthrow the Duvalier regime (U.S. Department of State, 1960: 340-341) . Indeed the most active exile activity at the time originated in Cuba, where Castro made available to Haitian exiles a radio station and logistical support for invasions of Haiti, which proved abortive.
Charging that the commuist menace emanating from Cuba threatened the security of his country, Duvalier took a firm anticommunist posture in foreign affairs and stressed his loyalty to the U.S. (Heinl, and Heinl, 1978) .4 When Newbegin returned to Haiti, U.S. relations were conducted on a "cool but correct" basis. (Heinl, and Heinl, 1978: 622).
Haitian exiles willing to undertake military action were not in the vanguard of American policy toward Haiti, but they did play The rationale for this shift in policy was clear. The U. S. continued to find Haiti's support at the OAS extremely useful. In July 1964, Haiti voted along with the U. S. to impose OAS sanctions against Cuba. With the advent of the Dominican crisis in April 1965, Haiti's vote in the OAS was again crucial for U. S. interests. Despite considerable opposition among Latin American states to creating an Inter-American Peace Force to legitimize American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Haiti contributed to the bare two-thirds majority vote needed to pass the OAS resolution. There was also a sense among policymakers that, although Haiti was perhaps the most repressive nation in Latin America, it was also the poorest. Therefore, efforts to (New York Times, 1967; 1968a; 1968b; 1969a; 1969b; 1970) . In contrast, although CIA on-the-record financing of Cuban exile activities was terminated in May 1963, circumstantial evidence suggests that radical anti-Castro Cubans continued to receive secret U. S. government aid for at least another decade or more (Scanlan and Loescher, 1983: 116-137 (Boswell, 1982: 18-19 The great majority of Haitians who are illegally in.the United States say, when first apprehended, that they have come to the United, States to seek employment. In very few instances are they able to demonstrate that they have been or will be persecuted by their government. Frequently they claim that they will be punished on return to Haiti simply because they left their country without permission; but the evidence available to us does not support such claims. In cases such as these, it is not possible under present laws and regulations to conclude that they are other than illegal immigrants, subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings like similar illegal immigrants from nations throughout the world [U.S. Congress House, 1975: 4] .
In very few instances were cases ever referred to the U. S. Congress, Senate, 1974; Hanson, 1978: 107-141). In the case of Haitians, denial of asylum was generally Haitians who attempted to speak for themselves were often provided with inadequate translations or none at all. Following the initiation of the expedited procedure, the percentage of asylum claims denials and the numbers of Haitians being deported increased substantially (Lawyers Committee, 1978; Copeland and Fagen, 1982) .
Resort to the Courts
Advocates of refugee rights maintained that INS practices undermined due process guarantees and sanctioned a pattern of discriminatory treatment toward asylum seekers from Haiti.
Lawyers for the Haitians also insisted that Haitians, if returned home, would be subject to persecution.
Several lawsuits were filed on behalf of the Haitians during 1979, temporarily blocking INS deportation proceedings. In National Council of Churches v. INS, the plaintiffs asked for the names of all Haitians who had been returned to Haiti in order to be able to follow up on these names and possibly prove individual persecution. Partly in response to this lawsuit, the State Department sent a study team to Haiti in May 1979 to investigate charges that Haitian refugees were being persecuted upon their return.
The study team reported that it had found no evidence of such persecution (U. S. State Department, 1979; Hooper, 1980) . In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, a class action suit, some 4000
Haitians challenged the INS mass deportation policies, and in National Council of Churches v. Egan the plaintiffs charged that the INS, in revoking work authorizations for the Haitians as part of its expedited processing, was not following the Administrative Procedures Act (Copeland and Fagen, 1982; Zucker, 1983) .
In nearly every instance, the courts found for the plaintiffs. The This Program, in its planning and executing, is offensive to every notion of constitutional due process and equal protection. The Haitians whose claims for asylum were rejected during the Program shall not be deported until they are given a fair chance to present their claims for political asylum. (Hooper, 1980: 29-32; Amnesty, 1980; U.S. State Department, 1980a: 77-78; Stepick, 1982 Determination of a particular asylum claim is not a general referendum of human rights in the home country .... Instead, we must apply a narrow and clearly focused standard established by treaty and by US statutes. The question in passing on an asylum application is this: Does this particular individual have a "wellfounded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion if he or she were to return to the home country? [U.S. Congress, House, 1980: 207; Rivera, 1980: 300] Thus,
Most of the applications we receive from Haitian nationals base the asylum claim solely on the fact that the applicants have 19, 1980 19, (later extended to October 10, 1980 By mid 1981, most aspects of the Haitian program were set in place. In May, the Reagan administration began detaining without the possibility of bond all Haitians subject to exclusion.
In June, the INS resumed mass exclusion hearings, often in closed-door courtrooms from which attorneys were barred, and all Haitians applying for work authorizations were arrested by the INS (Zucker, 1983) . When protests from the Congressional Black Caucus and others brought these practices to a halt, the INS adopted a policy of routinely detaining all arriving Haitians in substandard facilities, sending some to the coldest or the most remote parts of the United States and others to Puerto Rico .1o In these camps, Haitians were often denied access to legal counsel, were subjected to harassment, and rushed throughproforma asylum hearings.
In September 1981, the U.S. initiated a program that sought to circumvent the courts altogether. President Reagan signed an Executive Order authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept vessels believed to be transporting Haitians who intended to enter the U.S. illegally and to return them to Port-au-Prince (U.S. GAO Report, 1983) . A Haitian Navy liaison officer was assigned to the Coast Guard cutter on station, and the U.S. promised to help train and provide the Haitian Navy and Army with the means to patrol their coastline in order to prevent their countrymen from leaving. At the same time, Congress adopted legislation, (Abrams, 1982: 43-45) .
Root Causes and Haitian Emigration
An asylum policy that proceeds from preconceived ideological biases and seeks to control immigration flow without looking into underlying causes is shortsighted. In the long run the only effective way of reducing the flow of Haitians to the U.S. is to address concretely the conditions that create refugees (Scanlan and Loescher, 1982: 39-56 (Gastil, 1982; OAS, 1983; Amnesty, 1981; Lawyers Committee, 1983) . In fact, the human rights record of Haiti is regarded by Freedom House in New York as even worse than Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba (Gastil, 1982: 282, 299).
Despite Haiti's abysmal record, the prospects for a forceful human rights policy under the Reagan administration seem rather poor. Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Reagan is motivated by his intention to defend the security interests of the U.S. and by expression of concern about the Marxist threat in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and, in particular, by Cuba's efforts to export revolution in the region. This has resulted, among other things, in the U.S. resuming a policy of nearly unrestricted arms sales to governments in the area regardless of their human rights violations. In order to carry out this policy, the U.S. State Department has had to underplay the extent of human rights violations among its aid recipients (Hooper, 1981; Americas Watch, 1982; The pressure to migrate will continue as long as the countryside lacks employment opportunities and even the most rudimentary services in health, education and public services. Job creation, therefore, must continue to be one of the economy's prime aims [McPherson, 1982] . (Lundahl, 1979; Miami Herald, 1982) . According to a 1982 report of the General Accounting Office, the AID program objectives of strengthening the Haitian government's commitment to equitable economic and social development programs have had only "limited ability to impact on Haiti's dire poverty, and many projects have had less than satisfactory results" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982: 6) 13 The report further states that "AID's current program will not likely result in a fundamental turnaround to Haiti's dire economic condition, nor will it substantially alter the economic factors encouraging emigration" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982) .
Rather, the continued neglect of the rural areas suggests that pressures for the displacement of peasants from the countryside will intensify and that large-scale rural-urban migration may be the result. These pressures will, in turn, be exacerbated by the Reagan administration's temporarily successful efforts to curb illegal Haitian emigration to the U.S. The danger is that the closing of Haiti's traditional "safety valve" of out-migration may well result in increased immigration to Port-au-Prince, which is already overcrowded and cannot respond to a massive influx of more people. Thus, the probability of internal political unrest, persecution, and more out-migration in spite of enforcement efforts is great, and the U.S. should be prepared for a possible mass asylum crisis involving Haitians in the future. Haiti is in a desperate economic situation and will continue to rely on large infusions of external aid for the foreseeable future. It is essential that aid be directed to basic needs and focus on the peasants, which is not the case at present.
At the same time, in confronting the myriad problems posed by mass asylum, the United States should not lose sight of the fact that political asylum was created for humanitarian reasons to help carefully defined groups. It may be that a substantial number of Haitians are not refugees under the international standard set out in the Refugee Act of 1980. Many of the Haitians, however, will be bonafide refugees. If the United States is serious about human rights in Haiti, it must be willing to offer the hope of protection for those Haitians with the courage to begin the democratization process there. The U.S. must not let its legitimate concern for controlling its borders interfere with its obligation to let those who are refugees into the country. The means should be developed to make the U.S. asylum system more efficient within the context of international and constitutional obligations and constitutional obligations and American humanitarian ideals, and to ensure that it does not prevent or circumvent the process altogether for political reasons. Rather, distortions in the reporting seem to reflect efforts to further political ends relating to the particular countries.
Among the most serious distortions we noted are contained in the reports of El Salvador and Haiti.
In the case of El Salvador, ... 
